THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894

REPORT OF COURT

(No. S. 469)

s.t. "LORD STANHOPE" O.N. 163990

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at the Town Hall, Fleetwood, on the 15th and 16th days of September 1964 before Mr. J. V. Naisby, Q.C., assisted by Captain H. S. Hewson, Captain G. Ayre and Mr. W. J. Wood, M.B.E., into the circumstances attending the stranding and subsequent total loss of the steam trawler "Lord Stanhope" on the South Coast of Iceland on the 7th November, 1963.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the said stranding and loss were caused partly by the wrongful fault or default of the Skipper, George Harrison, in the following respects:—

1. Setting unsafe courses, having regard to the possibility, and indeed probability, of the vessel being set to the northward and towards the shore when proceeding at half speed in the conditions of wind and sea prevailing.

2. Failing to appreciate from the positions already obtained that the vessel was in fact being set to the northward.

3. Failing to heed the warnings in the Arctic Pilot as to the possibility of an inshore set and the difficulty of ascertaining distances from the coast owing to the fact that it was low-lying with high land behind.

4. Failing to have regard to the possibility of magnetic disturbance of the compass.

5. Failing to give clear orders to the acting Bosun as to the course to be steered after he left the bridge and partly by the wrongful fault or default of acting Bosun. John James Larkin, in failing to keep a good look-out when approaching the vicinity of the Ingolfshofdi Light and the Court suspends the Skipper's Certificate of the said George Harrison for twelve months from today, and it is ordered that the said George Harrison do pay the sum of £100 towards the cost of this Formal Investigation. The Court also censures the said John James Larkin.

Dated this 17th day of September, 1964.

J. V. NAISBY, Judge.

We concur in the above Report.

 

H. S. HEWSON

 

 

G. AYRE

Assessors.

 

W. J. WOOD

 

ANNEX TO THE REPORT

1. The "Lord Stanhope" was a steel single-screw steam trawler built in 1935 by Messrs. Cochrane & Sons Limited, of Selby, as a coal-burner and converted to oil-burning in 1947. Her gross tonnage was 448.48 tons. She was 157.35 feet in length, 26.15 feet in beam and 14.15 feet in depth. The vessel was propelled by a steam triple-expansion reciprocating engine made by Messrs. C. D. Holmes & Company Limited, of Hull. The steering gear consisted of a steam engine abaft the wheelhouse operated by a hand wheel in the wheelhouse and connected to the quadrant aft by a system of rods and chains. She was classed 100 A1 at Lloyds, and the classification certificates in respect of hull and machinery were in order.

2. The "Lord Stanhope" was equipped with one radar set, two echo sounders and a radio direction finder, a radio telephone transmitter and receiver, two wireless receivers and V.H.F. All this equipment was inspected at Fleetwood before the vessel sailed and found to be in order.

3. The compasses with which the vessel was equipped were two magnetic nine-inch liquid compasses, one fitted overhead in the wheelhouse as a steering compass, and the standard compass was on a pole forward of the bridge. These compasses were last adjusted on the 21st March, 1963, and a deviation card issued which showed that there was no deviation except a deviation of one-eighth of a point on courses between NE by E and E by N on the pole compass and between ESE and SE by S on the steering compass.

4. The "Lord Stanhope" was also supplied with three hand leads and lines and two patent logs.

5. The lifesaving appliances installed consisted of one wood lifeboat for 23 persons housed under a swinging derrick aft, 26 Victory type lifejackets, six lifebuoys, two 12-man inflatable rafts, two 10-man inflatable rafts, one Schermuly line-throwing appliance and twelve Schermuly distress parachute rockets. The four inflatable rafts were last inspected in Hull somewhere about November, 1962, and were due for inspection again upon the return of the "Lord Stanhope" from her fatal voyage. The remaining lifesaving appliances were inspected at Fleetwood on the 10th May, 1963, and found in order.

6. The "Lord Stanhope" sailed from Fleetwood about 0500 hours G.M.T. on the 26th October, 1963, manned by a crew of 19 hands all told. Not long after leaving, however, the Bosun was taken ill and landed at Belfast and a deckhand named John James Larkin was promoted acting Bosun for the voyage. The destination of the vessel was the Icelandic fishing grounds and when she sailed she was in all respects seaworthy and supplied with adequate charts and publications for the voyage, including the 'Acrtic Pilot', Vol. II. The vessel duly reached the western Icelandic fishing grounds and after fishing for a short time and catching about 25 tons of fish the weather deteriorated and on the 5th November it was decided to move to the eastern Icelandic fishing grounds in the hope of finding better weather. About 1215 hours on the 6th November Portland lighthouse was visually observed by the Skipper who obtained a bearing and distance by radar which placed the vessel about 5.3 miles south-west of the lighthouse. At this time the "Lord Stanhope" was on a course of south-east magnetic and, with engines working full speed ahead, was making about 11 knots, the weather having moderated, the wind being E. Force 4 and the sea still somewhat rough and the visibility moderate to good. Course was then altered to south-east half east magnetic but wind and sea again increased and at 1445 hours, the wind then being E. by N. Force 7, a radar distance and bearing was obtained by the Skipper which placed the vessel in a position 22.4 miles S.E. by S. 1/2 S. from Reynisdrangar. Speed was reduced to half and the course altered to E. 3/4 N. The watch at this time consisted of two deckhands but the Skipper was on the bridge and continued there until about 1830 hours when the watch was taken over by the Second Hand. The wind was still E. by N. but had increased to Force 8 with a heavy sea and the visibility was again reduced to moderate. The Second Hand was instructed to continue on the course of E. 3/4 N. Some time between 1800 hours and 1830 hours the Second Hand stated that he obtained a distance and bearing from Medallandsandr light. This distance was stated to be 8.9 miles but it is not certain whether, when the bearing was taken, the light was abeam or a point forward of the beam.

7. The Second Hand stated that he put this position on the chart and before leaving the bridge reported it to the Skipper who had gone below shortly after the Second Hand took over the watch. From 1830 hours the watch consisted of two deckhands, with the Skipper again on the bridge for most of the time. During this watch no further fixes were obtained. At 2230 hours the watch changed again and the acting Bosun took over the watch, accompanied by a deckhand named Martin. There was a discrepancy in the evidence as to what course was being steered at this time. The acting Bosun and Martin both stated that the course given to them was East whereas the deck log records no change up to that time from a course of E. 3/4 N. Before this change of watch, somewhere about 2100 hours, the radar had failed and the Skipper had been in radio telephone communication with the wireless operator on another trawler belonging to the same owners, named the "Kingston Diamond" which was also proceeding from the Western to the Eastern Icelandic fishing grounds and was in the neighbourhood of the "Lord Stanhope", proceeding at a slightly greater speed, having passed to the northward of the "Lord Stanhope" some time during the Second Hand's watch. The Skipper obtained suggestions from the wireless operator as to what might be wrong with the radar and what he could do to correct it but after having tried to obtain a picture on the radar and failed and after the acting Bosun came on watch the Skipper gave up the attempt to repair the radar and altered course to E. 1/2 N. His explanation for this change of course was that he saw that the "Kingston Diamond" was making a slightly more southerly course than he was and he desired to keep her still on his port bow. There was a discrepancy again in the evidence as to the bearing of the "Kingston Diamond" at this time. The Skipper stated she was still on his port bow, whereas the deckhand, Martin, stated that when he came on watch about 2240 hours the "Kingston Diamond" was on the starboard bow. In fact, the course of the "Kingston Diamond" on the late evening of the 6th was E. nothing to starboard, at any rate until 2230 hours. There is no alteration of course recorded in her log until 0100 hours on the 7th November, when the course is recorded as being E. by S. 1/2 (presumably 1/2 S.). The Bosun of the "Kingston Diamond", however, who came on watch at 2230 hours on the night of the 6th stated that he was given a course when he came on watch of E. by S. The exact courses of the "Kingston Diamond" up to about 0100 hours on the 7th November may be in doubt, but it is clear that at about that time she did haul out a little to the southward because she found she was being set in to the northward towards the land.

8. About 2300 hours the Skipper went below but before leaving the bridge he instructed the acting Bosun to call him when Ingolfshofdi Light was seen or if not seen to call him about 0200 hours on the 7th November. The acting Bosun was also told to call the Skipper if there was any change in the direction or velocity of the wind. The Skipper also said that he instructed the acting Bosun to keep the "Kingston Diamond" on the port bow. The acting Bosun, however, stated that he never had any such order, nor was it heard by the Deckhand on watch. The Court is satisfied that the Skipper did say something to the effect of keeping the "Kingston Diamond" on the port bow, but is equally satisfied that this instruction was not made plain to Larkin, and therefore when the "Kingston Diamond" was seen to be altering course to the southward the course of E. 1/2 N. was continued.

9. After the Skipper left the bridge, the course of E. 1/2 N. was continued with the engines still working at half speed ahead, and nothing was seen of any shore lights. The acting Bosun and the Deckhand on watch took alternate turns at the wheel of about an hour each, and after the Deckhand had completed his first trick at the wheel he went below to make a cup of tea. How much of the time when the acting Bosun was at the wheel the Deckhand was on the bridge is somewhat uncertain. However, about 0200 hours on the 7th November both the acting Bosun and the Deckhand were on the bridge, and the acting Bosun went down to call the Skipper. Some ten or fifteen minutes later the Skipper not having appeared when called, was called again, and after the acting Bosun again returned to the bridge the Deckhand was sent to call out the next watch. At about 0220 hours, as the Skipper was about to come up to the bridge, the "Lord Stanhope" struck the coast of Iceland about four miles west of Ingolfshofdi Light.

10. Upon the vessel striking the rocks her head swung round to port. She took a dangerous list and seas swept over the after part of the vessel. Upon the vessel striking the acting Bosun immediately stopped the engines and, as soon as he got on to the bridge, the Skipper rang them full astern but with no result. The Skipper also spoke to the Skipper of the "Kingston Diamond" on the radio-telephone and informed him of the fact of the stranding and the approximate position of the "Lord Stanhope". The "Kingston Diamond", which was then rounding Ingolfshofdi Light, at once turned round and went back to the westward, and after a short search succeeded in locating the position of the stranded trawler and stood by. The Skipper of the "Kingston Diamond" also informed the Icelandic authorities ashore of the casualty. In the weather conditions prevailing there was nothing else that the "Kingston Diamond" could have done. The four inflatable life rafts were stowed, two on top of the engine casing and one on each side in way of the after gallows. Efforts were made to launch two of these, but when partly inflated they were swept by the sea into contact with some object and damaged. An attempt was made to launch a third life raft which was put over the side, but the line attaching this raft to the vessel was carried away by the sea, and it was decided to await daylight before making any further attempt to leave the ship.

At daylight a party was seen ashore, and the fourth life raft was successfully launched with nine men in it, and by means of the Schermuly rocket apparatus on the "Lord Stanhope" a line was fired ashore followed by a heavier rope which was secured by the party on shore and attached to the trawler at the other end and the life raft was successfully hauled to the shore. By some misadventure the line between ship and shore was let go and a further rocket was fired from the trawler and another rope passed ashore by means of which the life raft was hove back to the "Lord Stanhope" and the Skipper and remaining members of the crew also got ashore in the liferaft. Upon the crew of the "Lord Stanhope" reaching shore, they were guided to shelter and well looked after by the local inhabitants.

11. The Court is of opinion that the course of E. 3/4 N. ordered by Skipper Harrison at 1445 hours on the 6th November was an unsafe course having regard to the possibility, and indeed probability, of the vessel being set to the northward and towards the shore when proceeding at half speed in the conditions of wind and weather prevailing. Skipper Harrison also failed to appreciate that the positions fixed at that time and when the Medallsandr Light was about abeam at 1830 hours gave a clear indication that the "Lord Stanhope" was in fact not making good the course ordered. The "Arctic Pilot" contains warnings as to the possibility of an inshore set and the difficulty of ascertaining distances from the coast owing to the fact that it is low-lying with high land behind. The Skipper stated that he knew of these warnings in the "Pilot" but paid no heed to them. Both the "Arctic Pilot" and the chart contain cautions as to the danger of relying only upon compass courses in this area because of the possibility of magnetic disturbance of the compass. Whatever may have been the reason why the vessel was not in fact making good the course ordered or anything like it, the positions obtained mentioned above clearly showed that the course being made good was a dangerous one and that if prolonged would land the vessel ashore. The Court is also of opinion that the alteration of course from E. 3/4 N. to E. 1/2 N. was totally inadequate to allow the vessel to clear Ingolfshofdi and that the course being made good should have shown to the Skipper the total inadequacy of such a small alteration. This fault was all the greater because by that time assistance from the radar was no longer available. In the opinion of the Court Skipper Harrison was also gravely to blame for not giving clear and precise orders to the acting Bosun as to the course to be steered after he left the bridge and impressing upon him that because of the absence of radar he was to keep the "Kingston Diamond" on his port bow so that the track of the "Lord Stanhope" round Ingolfshofdi would always be further out than that of the "Kingston Diamond". The acting Bosun was only an acting Bosun, unfamiliar with chart work, and the situation demanded that the clearest possible orders should be given by the Skipper before leaving him in charge of the watch.

12. The Court is of opinion that the acting Bosun John James Larkin, was at fault in failing to keep a good look-out. The Light of Ingolfshofdi was never seen by him or by the deck hand on watch although it had ben seen at intervals from the "Kingston Diamond" through the spray at a distance of about 10 miles, and the Court sees no reason why it should not have been visible from the "Lord Stanhope" at about half that distance. This failure to keep a good look-out resulted in the vessel continuing on a course which led to the stranding.

13. Once again the Court desires to record its appreciation of the promptitude and competence displayed by an Icelandic shore rescue party and of the hospitality and care shown to shipwrecked mariners by the Icelandic people.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. 1. By whom was the "Lord Stanhope" owned at the time of her stranding and subsequent total loss?

A. Wyre Trawlers Limited, Fleetwood.

Q. 2. Where, when and by whom was the "Lord Stanhope" built?

A. Selby, 1935, Cochrane & Sons Limited.

Q. 3. (a) With what compasses was the "Lord Stanhope" fitted?

(b) When were the compasses last adjusted?

(c) Were the compasses in satisfactory working order on 6th-7th November, 1963?

A. (a) Two magnetic compasses.

(b) 21st March. 1963.

(c) Yes.

Q. 4. (a) With what other navigational aids was the "Lord Stanhope" fitted?

(b) Were all such navigational aids in efficient working order during the last voyage up to the time of her stranding?

A. (a) Radar, two echo-sounders, Direction Finder, Radio Telephone transmitter and receiver, two wireless receivers and V.H.F. Three hand leads and lines. Two patent logs.

(b) Yes, except that the radar became inoperative about 2100 hours on the 6th November.

Q. 5. Was the "Lord Stanhope" supplied with adequate charts and publications for the voyage on which she stranded?

A. Yes.

Q. 6. How many officers and men did the "Lord Stanhope" carry on the voyage on which she stranded?

A. 18 hands all told at the time of the stranding.

Q. 7. Was the "Lord Stanhope" in all respects seaworthy when she sailed on the voyage on which she stranded?

A. Yes.

Q. 8. (a) When did the "Lord Stanhope" leave Fleetwood on the voyage on which she stranded?

(b) What was her destination?

A. (a) About 0500 hours G.M.T. on the 26th October, 1963.

(b) The Icelandic fishing grounds.

Q. 9. (a) What visual bearing was obtained about noon G.M.T. on the 6th November, 1963?

(b)In what position did such bearing show the "Lord Stanhope" to be?

(c) Who made such observation?

(d) Was such bearing then marked on a chart?

(e) What chart was then in use?

(f) At the time of such observation what was the course and speed of the "Lord Stanhope"?

(g) At the time of such observation what was the state of the weather, wind, sea and visibility?

A. (a) A visual bearing was obtained about 1215 hours of Portland.

(b) About 5.3 miles south west magnetic from Portland Lighthouse.

(c) The Skipper.

(d) According to the evidence, yes.

(e) Admiralty Chart 2980, 1942 Edition.

(f) S.E. magnetic. Speed full about 11 knots.

(g) Moderating, wind E. Force 4, sea still somewhat rough and the visibility moderate to good.

Q. 10. (a) Was the position of the "Lord Stanhope" fixed about 2 1/2 hours after the observation referred to in Question 9?

(b) If so, by what means was the position fixed, and by whom?

(c) Was such position marked, on a chart, and, if so, by whom?

(d) At about this time was the course and speed of the "Lord Stanhope" altered, and, if so, by whom and why, and what was the new course and speed?

(e) At about this time what was the state of the weather, wind, sea and visibility?

A. (a) Yes.

(b) By radar by the Skipper.

(c) Yes, by the Skipper.

(d) Yes. Course was altered to E. 3/4 N. and speed reduced to half by the Skipper because the weather had deteriorated.

(e) The weather was deteriorating, the wind being E. by N., Force 7, with a rough sea and reducing visibility.

Q. 11. (a) Was the position of the "Lord Stanhope" fixed subsequently to the position referred to in Question 10?

(b) If so, by whom was such position fixed, by what means, and what was the position?

(c) Was such position marked on a chart, and was it reported to the Skipper, and, if so, by whom?

A. (a) Yes.

(b) By the Second Hand by radar. See paragraph 6 of Annex to the Report.

(c) Yes, it was marked by the Second Hand and reported by him to the Skipper before going off watch.

Q. 12. (a) During what period of the evening and early night of 6th November, 1963, was the Skipper on the bridge?

(b) Was the ship's position fixed during this period, and, if so, by whom and by what means?

(c) What happened to the radar set during this period?

(d) What navigational aids other than radar were used during this period?

(e) Was the course altered during this period and, if so, when, by whom, and why?

(f) Toward the end of this period what was the state of the weather, wind, sea and visibility?

(g) When did the Skipper leave the bridge?

(h) After the Skipper left the bridge, who was left in charge of the watch, and who was on watch with him?

(i) What orders did the Skipper give to the Officer of the Watch before leaving the bridge?

A. (a) From 1900 hours or a little before until about 2300 hours.

(b) No.

c) See paragraph 7 of Annex to the Report.

(d) None other than the compass.

(e) See paragraph 7 of Annex to the Report.

(f) Worsening slightly, E. x N. Force 8 Heavy sea. Moderate to poor visibility.

(g) About 2300 hours.

(h) The acting Bosun and Deckhand Martin.

(i) See paragraph 8 of Annex to the Report.

Q. 13. (a) After the Skipper had left the bridge was the position of the "Lord Stanhope" fixed and, if so, by whom and by what means?

(b) After the Skipper had left the bridge was any use made of any of the navigational aids other than the compass?

(c) After the Skipper had left the bridge was any use made of a chart?

(d) After the Skipper had left the bridge was the course or speed of the "Lord Stanhope" altered?

(e) After the Skipper had left the bridge, were the lights of another vessel seen and, if so, what vessel, and when were such lights last seen?

(f) Was a report made to the Officer of the Watch about the lights referred to in (e), and, if so, what report, by whom, and what action was taken as a result of such report?

(g) After the Skipper had left the bridge were any navigational lights on shore seen?

A. (a) No.

(b) No.

(c) No.

(d) No.

(e) The lights of the "Kingston Diamond" were then in sight and continued to be so until about midnight.

(f) Deckhand Martin reported to the acting Bosun that the lights were bearing away to starboard. No action was taken.

(g) No.

Q. 14. (a) When, on the morning of 7th November, 1963, did the Officer of the Watch call the Skipper, and with what result?

(b) Where and when did the "Lord Stanhope" strand?

(c) What was the course and speed of the vessel on stranding?

(d) What was the state of the weather, wind, sea and visibility on stranding?

(e) What action did the Skipper take after stranding?

A. (a) About 0200 hours and again some 10 or 15 minutes later. After the first call the Skipper dropped off to sleep again and after the second call he was just coming up to the bridge when the vessel struck.

(b) About 0220 hours on the 7th November and about 4 miles West of Ingolfshofdi Light.

(c) E. 1/2 N. Half speed approximately 5 knots.

(d) Recorded as Wind E. x N. Force 7. Heavy swell. Moderate visibility.

(e) His immediate action was to put the engines full speed astern without any result and report the stranding by radio telephone to the Skipper of the "Kingston Diamond". See further pargraph 10 of the Annex to the Report.

Q. 15. After the stranding were all proper steps taken by the Skipper for the preservation of his vessel and crew?

A. Yes, for the preservation of the crew. Beyond reporting the position there was nothing he could do as far as the vessel was concerned.

Q. 16. Were the crew of the "Lord Stanhope" saved, and if so, by what means?

A. Yes. By liferaft from the ship with the aid of an Icelandic rescue party ashore and lines passed from the ship by rocket.

Q. 17. What was the cause of the stranding, and subsequent total loss, of the "Lord Stanhope"?

A. The main cause of the stranding and loss of the "Lord Stanhope" was the wrongful fault or default of the Skipper, George Harrison, in the following respects:—

1. Setting unsafe courses, having regard to the possibility, and indeed probability, of the vessel being set to the northward and towards the shore when proceeding at half speed in the conditions of wind and sea prevailing.

2. Failing to appreciate from the positions already obtained that the vessel was in fact being set to the northward.

3. Failing to heed the warnings in the "Arctic Pilot" as to the possibility of an inshore set and the difficulty of ascertaining distances from the coast owing to the fact that it was low-lying with high land behind.

4. Failing to have regard to the possibility of magnetic disturbance of the compass.

5. Failing to give clear orders to the acting Bosun as to the course to be steered after he left the bridge.

A contributory cause of the stranding and loss of the vessel was the failure of the of the acting Bosun, John James Larkin, to to keep a good look-out when approaching the vicinity of Ingolfshofdi Light.

Q. 18. Was the stranding, and subsequent total loss, of the "Lord Stanhope" caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of:—

(a) her Skipper, George Harrison?

(b) her Bosun, John James Larkin?

(c) any other person or persons?

A. (a) Yes, in the respects stated in the answer to the last question.

(b) Yes, in the respect stated in the answer to the last question.

(c) No.

J. V. NAISBY, Judge.

 

H. S. HEWSON

 

 

G. AYRE

Assessors.

 

W. J. WOOD

 

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